Cultural Differences in Perceptual Reorganization in US and Pirahã Adults by Yoon, Jennifer M. D. et al.
Cultural Differences in Perceptual Reorganization in US
and Piraha˜ Adults
Jennifer M. D. Yoon1*, Nathan Witthoft2, Jonathan Winawer1, Michael C. Frank2, Daniel L. Everett4,
Edward Gibson3
1Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, United States of America, 2Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, United States
of America, 3 Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT, Cambridge, MA, United States of America, 4Department of Sociology, Bentley University, Waltham, MA, United States of
America
Abstract
Visual illusions and other perceptual phenomena can be used as tools to uncover the otherwise hidden constructive
processes that give rise to perception. Although many perceptual processes are assumed to be universal, variable
susceptibility to certain illusions and perceptual effects across populations suggests a role for factors that vary culturally.
One striking phenomenon is seen with two-tone images—photos reduced to two tones: black and white. Deficient
recognition is observed in young children under conditions that trigger automatic recognition in adults. Here we show a
similar lack of cue-triggered perceptual reorganization in the Piraha˜, a hunter-gatherer tribe with limited exposure to
modern visual media, suggesting such recognition is experience- and culture-specific.
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Introduction
A core principle of vision science is that perception is not simply
a passive reflection of the external world, but a process of
constructive interpretation of inherently ambiguous input. Con-
sider a shadow projected onto a wall. The same silhouette can be
created by different objects of different sizes at different distances
from the viewer. Images projected onto the retina have the same
inherent ambiguity, and a wide range of perceptual judgments
ranging from lightness [1], to color, to depth, to shape and
identity, are the result of ‘‘unconscious inferences’’ by the visual
system [2]. Such inferences are often presumed to be automatic
and culturally universal [3–5].
The interpretative processes that give rise to a coherent percept
or ‘‘gestalt’’ often occur effortlessly and without awareness, but
they can be made explicit by examining images that are not
correctly interpreted upon initial viewing, such as the famous two-
tone depiction of the Dalmatian in the snow [6] or the two-tone
ocelot in Figure 1 (right column, second row). People often fail to
recognize the two-tone image; when shown the corresponding
photograph, however, they find the two-tone often transforms
suddenly into a coherent percept. Observers viewing the ocelot in
the two-tone will often make figure-ground errors, incorrectly
assigning some background regions to the figure, some figure
regions to the background. Reconfiguring figure-ground assign-
ments after viewing the photograph is to ‘‘reorganize’’ one’s initial
grouping to achieve a different perceptual state [7]. If the viewer
ultimately recognizes the previously unrecognized image, percep-
tion reorganization is said to have been successful. (Following the
Gestalt school, we use the terms ‘‘perceptual organization’’ and
‘‘perceptual reorganization’’ to emphasize the process by which
local image features are appropriately integrated or segregated in
order to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of the image—a
‘‘gestalt’’ [4]).
Not all two-tone images require perceptual reorganization
through extrinsic cueing to be recognized. Many logos are
designed to be easily recognized while consisting of only two
tones (e.g., the World Wildlife Federation’s panda logo), and
simple black and white line drawings are similarly recognizable on
initial presentation. It is nonetheless the case that one can create
two-tone images that challenge the perceptual system and for this
special type of two-tone image, presentation of the corresponding
photo cue readily triggers perceptual reorganization [8–10].
Many of the principles underlying perceptual organization are
thought to be universal, based on demonstrations of sensitivity to
these principles even in very young infants and remote cultures
[5,11]. There is also a body of evidence reporting variable
susceptibility to certain illusions and other perceptual phenomena
across different populations. These results suggest an important
role for culturally variable factors, including experience with
artifacts such as photographs [12] and digital clocks [13], culture-
specific processing biases [14], and exposure to urban versus rural
vistas [15]; for review of older work, see [16].
Culturally invariant mechanisms of development such as the
physiological maturation of the visual system predict differences in
perception between children and adults. But children may also
become more strongly enculturated into the practices of percep-
tual inference and interpretation accepted in their particular
community over time, similarly predicting differences in how
children and adults perceive the world [17]. One particularly
striking phenomenon in perceptual development is the deficient
recognition of two-tone images in young children under conditions
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that trigger automatic and effortless recognition in adults [7,18].
When faced with images like Figure 1 (even ones containing
familiar creatures), children—like adults—often struggle to recog-
nize the animal. But unlike the adults, children have very
significant difficulty recognizing the animal even when the two-
tone image is placed side by side with the original picture.
One issue that is left unaddressed by these developmental data is
whether the rapid perceptual reorganization reported by adults is
a necessary consequence of having a mature visual system, or
whether it is the result of knowledge and experience acquired in a
specific cultural context. To address this question, we turned to a
population with very different visual experience than the
participants in typical perception experiments: the Piraha˜. The
Piraha˜ are a hunter-gatherer tribe inhabiting a remote region of
the Amazon. They are of particular interest for our current study
because of their limited contact with modern visual media and
their sparse material culture [19]. Like young children in a modern
industrial culture, Piraha˜ adults have little experience or knowl-
edge of the visual transformation that links a photo and two-tone
image. But unlike children, they possess both physiologically
mature visual systems and a lifetime of experience with complex
visual tasks such as hunting and fishing.
We tested Piraha˜ adults and English-speaking controls on their
ability to recognize two-tone images given the corresponding
photographs as cues (Figure 1). We predicted that, like children
and U.S adults, the Piraha˜ would have difficulty recognizing two-
tone images uncued, that is without seeing the accompanying
photo. If expertise in interpreting symbolic visual materials is a key
factor in cue-triggered two-tone reorganization, then the Piraha˜—
like children but unlike U.S. adults—would have trouble
recognizing the cued image even in the presence of the photo.
Methods
Participants included adult members of the Piraha˜ tribe (n = 9,
mean estimated age = 30 y) and as controls tested with the same
stimuli, Stanford University students, faculty, and staff (n = 8,
mean age = 26 y). An additional control task with additional
stimuli was tested on Stanford students (n = 10, mean age = 19 y).
The visual acuity of the Piraha˜ population was tested by DE and
others some years earlier as part of a basic screen for medical
services; the population was on the whole normal, with no
cataracts and a small incidence of nearsightedness.
Ethics statement: All US participants gave written consent to
participate in this research, and the consent procedure and study
were approved by the Stanford University Institutional Review
Board. Written consent forms were stored in a secure location as
required by the Stanford Institutional Review Board. Experimen-
tal research with Piraha˜ participants was approved by the
University of Manchester Committee on the Ethics of Research
on Human Beings. This committee authorized a waiver of written
consent because the Piraha˜ participants were not able to read or
write. Participants gave oral consent and research goals were
explained (as well as possible, given both the linguistic and
conceptual vocabulary available) by DLE. The oral consent of all
Piraha participants was communicated by DLE to JMY and
recorded in a laboratory notebook.
Ten two-tone images were created in Photoshop by blurring
and posterizing (reducing the number of distinct gray scale values,
in this case to two: black and white) grayscale photographs of
animals and individuals found in the Piraha˜ participants’ everyday
environment (Figure 1). The amount of blur and the black/white
threshold points were set independently for each photograph
based on a repeated trial and error procedure until we were
satisfied with the subjective impressions that the two-tone was (a)
hard to recognize without first seeing the photograph from which
it was derived (‘‘uncued’’) and (b) easy to see after seeing the
photograph (‘‘cued’’). This stimulus creation and selection were
guided by the perceptual judgment of the experimenters. Images
were printed onto 12612 cm cards.
These two-tones are similar in appearance, but different in
method of stimulus creation (as well as experimental purpose) from
the stimuli known as ‘‘Mooney faces.’’ Mooney himself used the
stimuli to study ‘‘closure’’-based recognition of individual images,
analogous to our ‘‘stage 1 uncued’’ presentation. Mooney’s faces
were hand-drawn artist’s renderings of human faces under
extreme illumination conditions [20], so there is no corresponding
photo from which the images were derived.
Two other image pairs were tested which did not include two-
tones and for which the correspondence was easier to see
(Figure 2, top row, two image pairs). These served as warm-up
items and to ensure participants understood the task.
Each trial proceeded in three stages. In stage 1, participants
were shown a two-tone image and asked to indicate their
recognition by pointing to the location of the eye or Piraha˜
person in the picture (Figure 2). Responses were marked by
placing a sticker at the indicated locations. Trials in which the
target was not initially identified were considered ‘‘candidate
reorganization trials.’’ These trials were of particular interest as
they provided a test of whether an initially unrecognized two-tone
image could be successfully reinterpreted after seeing the
corresponding photo. These trials proceeded to stages 2 and 3.
In stage 2, participants were shown the corresponding photograph
alone and asked to point to the location of the eye or Piraha˜
person. In stage 3, the two-tone image and photograph were
shown side-by-side. The experimenter then pointed back and forth
between the two images using the Piraha˜ word for ‘‘same’’ to
convey the correspondence between photo and two-tone. After
this instruction, the subject was again asked to point to the location
of the eyes or person in the two-tone image.
Viewing distance for Piraha˜ participants ranged from about 1.5
to 3 ft and was not precisely controlled. Variability in this range is
unlikely to affect recognition. In a separate control study to test for
the possibility that close viewing interfered with perceptual re-
organization, U.S. adults viewed two-tones from a much closer
viewing distance than seen in any participants (9 in.) and
performed at ceiling on candidate reorganization trials (100%).
In addition, U.S. preschoolers, a similarly low reorganization
population, viewed two-tones from distances of 2 and 4 feet with
no difference in performance [21].
We additionally tested Stanford students on an alignment
manipulation task. This task controlled for the possibility that U.S.
participants’ performance on the task was not due to recognizing
the two-tone images, but merely to locating the point on the two-
tone card in the same location as the corresponding point in the
Figure 1. All stimuli used in the experiment. Row 1 shows warm-up items with simpler transformations: houseboat and jaguar. Rows 2–6 show
test items. Left column: squirrel monkey, alligator, woman in hut, sloths, older man. Right column: ocelot, howler monkey, toucan, tapir, fisherman.
Cue items are shown to the left of test items. For full size stimuli, see Figures S1–S12 in File S1 in order to recreate viewing conditions under which
recognition is trivial for western adults.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110225.g001
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photograph. This study was identical to the main study, except
that the images were cropped by 10% on two adjacent sides (e.g.,
top and left), chosen at random, with the constraint that the
corresponding two-tone and photo were not cropped on the same
two sides. Thus the eye or head was in a different location on the
printed card in the photo and in the two-tone. If US participants
were solving the task by pointing to the same location on the cards
rather than by identifying the image features in the two-tone
image, they would not have successfully located the eye in the two-
tone image in this experiment.
Results
Piraha˜ participants and U.S. control participants on the same
task successfully indicated the target locations (either eye or
person) on the non-two-tone practice images without the
corresponding photo cue (controls 100%, Piraha˜ 88.9%), showing
participants understood the task (Figure 3, white bars). Controls
located the targets successfully in uncued two-tone images on
72.5% of trials. Initial recognition in Piraha˜ participants was less
frequent (22.5% of trials). Controls identified the targets in the
corresponding, untransformed photos 100% of the time and the
Piraha˜ 90.3% of the time (Figure 3, black bars). All Piraha˜
participants correctly indicated the target on at least 7 of the 10
photos. Data from trials where the Piraha˜ did not correctly
recognize the photo were excluded from subsequent analysis.
The trials of primary interest were candidate reorganization
trials: trials on which participants did not initially locate the target
in the two-tone (incorrect Stage 1), but did locate it in the photo
cue image when it was presented alone (correct Stage 2). We
assessed performance on only these trials (% correct Stage 3) by
calculating the percentage of two-tones recognized after viewing
the photo cue and dividing by the total number of candidate
reorganization trials. U.S. control participants consistently showed
cue-driven perceptual reorganization, always (100%) correctly
indicating the eye or the Piraha˜ person on previously unrecog-
nized two-tones. In contrast, Piraha˜ participants succeeded on
candidate reorganization trials only 31.6% of the time. Two
Piraha˜ participants never demonstrated perceptual reorganization,
and the highest rate of reorganization for any Piraha˜ individual
was 60%.
Control participants in the misaligned condition—like the
controls in the main experiment but unlike Piraha˜ participants—
showed near perfect performance on candidate reorganization
Figure 2. Upper left: an example two-tone stimulus from the Piraha˜ study. Subjects were first presented the two-tone alone and asked to
point to the location of an eye or person in the image. Red circles mark where Piraha˜ participants indicated an eye, and numbers indicate individual
participants. Circles outside the image show responses of the form ‘‘there are no eyes here.’’ Only two participants (2,8) correctly pointed to an eye in
this image during Stage 1. Upper right: Performance of Piraha˜ participants on the original photo, which was presented alone after the two-tone
image was removed from view. All participants correctly pointed to one of the two eyes. Bottom row: performance of Piraha˜ participants on the two-
tone image during Stage 3, when it was shown side-by-side with the photo. Two Piraha˜ participants succeeded uncued (2 & 8), two more succeeded
with the photo present, indicating reorganization (3 & 4), and five did not show evidence of photo-triggered perceptual reorganization (1, 5, 6, 7, 9).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110225.g002
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trials (94.2%). This result would be expected if control participants
experienced reorganization, and their performance did not
depend solely on a spatial alignment strategy to localize features.
To summarize these observations statistically, we conducted a
repeated measures ANOVA with a 3-level within-subject factor
(trial type: practice items, photos, candidate reorganization trials)
and a 3-level between subject factor (group: Piraha˜, US controls,
US misaligned condition). There was a main effect of group
(F(2,23) = 32.6, g2 = 0.74, p,0.001) and a trial type x group
interaction (F(4,48) = 8.35, g2 = 0.41, p,0.001). Pairwise compar-
isons reveal that the Piraha˜ differ from both US groups
(ps,0.001), who do not differ from each other (Bonferroni
corrected). Similarly, accuracy on candidate reorganization trials
differs from accuracy on practice trials and photo recognition (ps,
0.001), which do not differ from each other. A follow-up t-test
compared Piraha˜ candidate reorganization performance to US
control performance in the misaligned condition (when US
controls do not have access to a non-recognition-based location
matching strategy), showing that Piraha˜ performance was signif-
icantly lower (t(17) = 8.26, p,0.001).
We include additional analyses in the discussion related to
different possible interpretations of Piraha˜ performance. Raw data
are available in Dataset S1.
Discussion
We tested whether Piraha˜ participants showed perceptual
reorganization of two-tone images when they were viewed side-
by-side with the original (cue) photograph from which they were
generated. Although U.S. control participants performed at
ceiling, successfully identifying the target location in every
previously unrecognized image, the Piraha˜ found this task
extremely challenging. The relative lack of cue-driven perceptual
reorganization in the Piraha˜ is especially striking in contrast to the
reported ease, vividness, and automaticity of reorganization in the
control group, which persisted in the face of spatial misalignment.
But why is reorganization so much less frequent in the Piraha˜
group? We begin by discussing candidate hypotheses relating to
strategic choices, task interpretation, stimulus familiarity, and task
difficulty, and then discuss possible conceptual or experiential
sources of differences in perceptual reorganization.
First, we take up the issue of whether possible strategic
differences rather than recognition differences between the Piraha˜
and US groups can explain our findings. One proposal is that the
US and Piraha˜ may have the same levels of cued two-tone
perceptual reorganization, around 30%. However, US partici-
pants are accurate on the remaining 70% of trials because of some
non-perceptual strategy they use that does not depend on
recognizing anything in the two-tone image. We can rule out
one version of this account, based on the results of the US
misaligned condition. US adults are just as accurate at finding a
corresponding feature between the photo and two-tone images
when the two images no longer share a predictable coordinate
frame relative to one another (e.g. as in Figure 4). Thus, they
would not be able to rely on simple matching of spatial coordinates
relative to the image frame to find the corresponding location in
the photo and two-tone image pairs. Instead, some level of
perceptual reorganization was required in order to identify the
unpredictably displaced location in the two-tone image within the
bounds of the recognized figure. Nevertheless, some weaker
version of this general hypothesis is similar to what we believe to
be true. In fact, the ‘‘perceptual literacy’’ hypothesis we describe
below specifically attributes Piraha˜ and US performance differ-
ences to cultural differences in training and education with visual
symbolic materials.
Second, our data are inconsistent with an account driven purely
by differences in task interpretation between the Piraha˜ and the
U.S. controls. Good performance on the practice trials and on the
photos themselves demonstrates that the Piraha˜ understood the
general task instructions. The experimenters made their best effort,
both verbally and gesturally, to explicitly indicate that the photo
and two-tone images corresponded and were ‘‘the same.’’ Even if
Piraha˜ participants did not know how to interpret the experi-
menter’s instructions initially, they would presumably understand
that the image pairs corresponded after a successful spontaneous
reorganization. However, success on one candidate reorganization
trial did not lead to reliable gains in accuracy on subsequent trials
(41% accuracy including only trials after first successful reorgani-
zation vs. 32% across all trials, two sample t-test, p=0.4),
suggesting that the experience of reorganization did not substan-
tially change the overall difficulty of the task.
Piraha˜ participants did sometimes respond ‘‘no eyes/person’’
when asked to find these targets on the two-tone images. One
might worry that the Piraha˜ do experience cued perceptual
reorganization similar to US adults – but they interpret the task
instruction of pointing to the target location differently from the
US participants. Perhaps they have a stricter criterion for
responding, ‘‘yes, here is the eye/person’’, and this is reflected in
their ‘‘no eye/person’’ responses. However, they gave this
response in only 37 of 90 trials, and 27 of the 37 occurred after
they had already made an accurate response by locating eyes or
people in previous two-tones. In addition, inspection of the specific
items reveals that each of the two-tone items was related to a ‘‘yes’’
response across at least two and as many as eight of the nine
participants. In other words, although items in our stimulus set
varied in the specific details of their appearance, no item was
judged by the Piraha˜ group to be completely featureless. These
items included both images that had clearly distinct eye-spots (e.g.,
squirrel monkey) and no distinct eye-spot (e.g., fisherman). It is
therefore more parsimonious to interpret the occasional ‘‘no eye/
person’’ responses as indicating lack of recognition as opposed to a
different interpretation of the task instructions.
Third, since the photographs depicted people and animals in
their environment, it is also unlikely that the result is due to a lack
of familiarity with the pictured items. In fact, the particular
Figure 3. Summary of results from the Piraha˜ and the two U.S.
control groups. Bars show participants’ accuracy on photographs,
practice items, and candidate reorganization trials (those trials on which
the two-tone image was not recognized uncued). Error bars show the
standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110225.g003
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animals and people depicted in the photographs were more
familiar to the Piraha˜ than the controls (one of the pictures
contained a person known to members of the tribe, and several of
the Piraha˜ participants spontaneously produced his name on
seeing the photo).
Two-tone image recognition can fail at multiple stages by
different mechanisms. A fourth, possibility is that poorer
performance among Piraha˜ participants in the candidate reorga-
nization trials was not due to a difficulty in using a photograph to
reinterpret a two-tone (presumably a more top-down process), but
rather a difficulty in recognizing the uncued two-tones, or simply a
difficulty with any hard task. Recognition could have failed at a
coarser level than photo and two-tone comparison—perhaps
during early bottom-up stages of processing like basic perceptual
organization, due to overall greater difficulty. Indeed, the Piraha˜
participants had significantly lower accuracy at two-tone recogni-
tion in the un-cued condition, indicating that two-tones are more
difficult for them to see. To address whether this also explains why
they were less likely to perceptually re-organize after seeing the
photo, we compared items of similar difficulty in U.S. and Piraha˜
groups.
There is currently no theory to predict what types of two-tones
will be reorganized more ‘‘vividly’’ or ‘‘completely’’ or ‘‘automat-
ically’’ than others. In the absence of such a theory, we define
difficult two-tones behaviorally, as those that are rarely recognized
uncued; similarly, easy two-tones are those that are recognized
frequently even when they are uncued. In pilot testing with a
larger set of stimuli (40) on U.S. adults (n = 9), successful
reorganization occurred consistently regardless of variation in
uncued performance – two-tone ‘‘difficulty.’’ Even for the 5 stimuli
with the poorest uncued recognition (46% success), participants
successfully re-organized on nearly all trials (93%), far more often
than the Piraha˜ in the main experiment reported here. In contrast,
considering only the two ‘‘easiest’’ stimuli with the highest uncued
recognition by the Piraha˜ (78% success), Piraha˜ participants who
did not initially recognize these stimuli still re-organized only
infrequently (25%, 1 of 4 trials). Assuming a binomial distribution
based on the reorganization probability of English speaking
participants (93%), the likelihood of the Piraha˜ data—reorganizing
only once or fewer out of 4 trials—is less than one percent. Thus,
we do not believe that difficulty in recognizing the two-tones
without a cue can explain our findings.
How then should we interpret the striking failure to reorganize
the two-tones in the Piraha˜ participants? Our data indicate that a
mature visual system is insufficient to guarantee good performance
on this task. It is possible that the similarly low rates of photo-
triggered reorganization of two-tone images in young U.S.
children [7,18] and Piraha˜ adults are unrelated. But the existence
of reduced reorganization in an adult population opens up the
possibility that developmental failures in perceptual reorganization
in young U.S. children may also be explained by a mechanism
distinct from visual system maturation. Thus, one possibility is that
the results reported here, together with the previous studies on
young children [7,18,21,22], reflect a role for expertise with visual
symbolic materials (writing, art, photos, etc) in assisting with
reorganization.
Visual symbolic materials are notably sparse in the Piraha˜
community, but ubiquitous in the US and other industrialized
cultures. A provocative interpretation of the current data is that
cultures with ubiquitous visual symbolic materials may entrain a
figurative ‘‘perceptual literacy,’’ analogous to reading literacy.
Such literacy would consist of a body of perceptual and cognitive
skills that together create expertise in decoding such materials.
What kinds of perceptual and cognitive skills might be included in
such visual symbolic expertise? Future research exploring remote
people’s performance on a battery of basic perceptual and
cognitive tasks would help address this question. One possibility
is that this figurative ‘‘perceptual literacy’’ may involve growing
skill in ‘‘imposing one’s imagined structure’’ as in the reversal of
ambiguous figures [23], though in this case the structure is derived
from one image (photo) and imposed onto another (two-tone). The
very act of bringing our knowledge and experience to bear on
perception in the way required for cued interpretation and
reinterpration of images may be the result of training and
experience that is culture-specific.
One prediction of this account is that participants’ degree of
cultural ubiquity and expertise with decoding visual symbolic
materials should relate to their degree of ease and automaticity
using visual cues to interpret ambiguous and impoverished images.
The present data show that this prediction holds for a special class
Figure 4. Example of misaligned photo and two-tone image pair. This image shows the actual degree of misalignment, but participants were
never informed about the degree or direction of misalignment or even if any misalignment or distortion occurred between the images. The
intersection of the horizontal and vertical red lines shows the same geometric point relative to the frame of the images. Participants could identify
these matching points even without reference to the underlying images (for example, if the cards were blank). Actual corresponding features are
shown with the red dot, and were displaced 1.8 cm in a direction that varied from image pair to image pair.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110225.g004
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of two-tone and photo image pairs and for two groups (Piraha˜ and
US) that differ widely in visual symbolic cultural ubiquity, but this
relation is at present correlational. And certainly it is not the case
that whatever perceptual skills US participants bring to the task
are completely absent in the Piraha˜ (as a group, they did benefit
from the presentation of the photo cue, locating the target region
on 31.6% of trials). However, if our ‘‘perceptual literacy’’
interpretation is correct, a strong prediction is that levels of
reorganization should track with symbolic exposure. Where
ubiquity of visual symbolic culture is intermediate between Piraha˜
and US groups, expertise in decoding such materials should
similarly be intermediate.
In their lack of expertise with visual symbols, young U.S.
children are similar to the adult Piraha˜, whose material culture
does not include a writing system, maps, or representational
artwork that would entrain such a skill [19]. Enculturation with
visual symbolic materials may provide the training required for
observers to navigate the dual nature of the two-tone and photo as
(1) objects in and of themselves, as well as (2) representations of
one another that are mutually informative. In Deloache’s research,
U.S. children were asked to find a doll hidden in a target room
based on the location demonstrated in a symbolic representation
of that room. She found surprising and robust failure to use a
smaller scale model room to decide where to find a doll hidden in
a larger target room, despite accurate memory for the configu-
ration of the model room. The cognitive challenge was to inhibit a
prepotent interpretation of the symbolic representation as an
entity in and of itself (representation 1), and instead rely on a
representation of the correspondence between target and symbol
(representation 2). Older more successful children could be
impaired if encouraged to play with the objects in the scale model
room, strengthening their representation of the room as an entity
in and of itself, overriding the representation that mapped the scale
model (visual symbolic artifact) to the target room. Conversely,
younger children were more successful when the scale model room
was placed behind glass, a small change that could help inhibit
their representation of the scale model as an entity in and of itself
[24].
Simplifying the challenge of dual representation (inhibiting
representation 1 and strengthening representation 2) has been
shown to aid inexperienced members of a culture (young U.S.
children) in using symbolically corresponding visual representa-
tions, even before they acquire expertise in ‘reading’ visual
symbols such as writing and maps [22]. One memorable method
involved convincing children that the scale model room was
physically the same entity as the target room due to transformation
by ‘‘shrinking machine’’ – thus inhibiting representation 1,
removing an interfering representation of the scale model room
as a distinct entity. It may be that similar manipulations could
enable Piraha˜ adults to reliably experience photo-cued perceptual
reorganization in the absence of a lifelong enculturation with
visual symbolic materials. Further research should address the
possibility that cultures that provide training in how to ‘read’ visual
symbols such as writing and maps can influence the practices of
perceptual inference and interpretation required for successful
perceptual reorganization.
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paper. Raw data for the Piraha˜ participants and US participants
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File S1 Supporting figures. Figure S1, Practice item 1
(Jaguar) at full size. When printed on 1168.5 inch paper, these
images are the same size as the cards used in the experiments. The
left image is the original image, and the right image is the
transformed (blurred) image. Figure S2, Practice item 2 (House-
boat) at full size. The left image is the original image, and the right
image is the transformed (gray-scale) image. Figure S3, Test item 1
(Alligator) at full size. The left image is the original and the right
image is the two-tone. Figure S4, Test item 2 (Sloths) at full size.
Figure S5, Test item 3 (Hut) at full size. Figure S6, Test item 4
(Older man) at full size. Figure S7, Test item 5 (Squirrel monkey)
at full size. Figure S8, Test item 6 (Ocelot) at full size. Figure S9,
Test item 7 (Fisherman) at full size. Figure S10, Test item 8
(Howler monkey) at full size. Figure S11, Test item 9 (Toucan) at
full size. Figure S12, Test item 10 (Tapir) at full size.
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